A major potential of agent technologies is the ability to support personalized learning. This is a trend where students are taking more control of their learning in the form of personal choice over topics, activities and tools. In this context, in previous work we presented a multiagent system based on an iterative voting protocol where student agents could vote to decide which courses the university would be running; those courses with little to no interest would be cancelled. This work assumed that the preferences for different courses were independent, which is not always realistic. In this paper, we extend this work and consider complex preferences. In particular, we assume substitutable and complementary preferences between courses. We show that, by using an intelligent voting strategy which tries to predict the voting result, and takes into account the interdependencies between the courses can outperform more naïve strategies. 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology 978-0-7695-4513-4/11 $26.00
Introduction
In many educational organizations there exit restriction on which courses might run, due to the overheads of running too many courses. Now, in the context of personalized learning, where students are taking more control of their learning, we would like the decision about which courses are run to be made collectively by the students, while taking into account their individual preferences. Multiagent systems are a powerful technology to tackle this complexity and to enable flexible course selection systems because of features such as autonomy, responsibility, social ability and intelligence [1, 2] .
In [3] , we presented a new iterative voting protocol, where student agents could vote for courses over several rounds. In each round, the course with the lowest numbers of votes was cancelled. In this previous work, the student preferences were modeled using a simple model where the preferences for each course are independent from others (meaning that if a course was cancelled it had no effect on the remaining preferences). For this setting, our experiments showed that an intelligent strategy, which adapts its voting based on the observed results in previous rounds, did not perform significantly better than a simpler strategy with no such learning.
However, it is not realistic to assume that all courses are independent. In practice, voters typically would like to express dependencies between courses such as "I would like to study course A only if I can study course B" (so-called complementary preferences) or "I would like to study course C or course D, but not both" (so-called substitutable preferences). In this paper we extend the voting system from [3] to these more complex preferences. In particular, we develop new strategies that take into account the interdependencies when casting the votes for the available courses. We show that, students using an intelligent strategy tries to predict the courses which will be running, and uses this to estimate the expected student satisfaction, achieve a higher average satisfaction. Moreover, the average student satisfaction generally increases as more students use the intelligent strategy. The objective in doing so is to demonstrate the potential of using multiagent systems and voting in settings where student have complex preferences and use a range of voting strategies.
In the rest of this paper, Section 2 describes the related literature, focusing on voting procedures and their relevance to agent technology. Section 3 introduces our simulation and modeling of complex preferences. Section 4 describes an experiment to test the performance of three different voting strategies (proportional, equal share and intelligent) and analyses the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background
Voting theory comes under area known as social choice, that making collective decisions that maximize the social welfare (the sum of welfare of individual agents), while at the same recognizing that agents are self-interested and act in a way that maximizes their own individual preference. In our e-learning scenario the university can only run courses that have sufficiently high interest, while students have to not only find courses which match their preferences, but also ensure that their most preferred courses to be selected.
Voting Procedures and Combinatorial Preferences
Voting systems provide an appropriate solution to reach a socially desirable decision, while taking into account individual preferences [4] . A voting system applies a set of rules that govern how votes are cast in an election, how they are aggregated, and how winners are determined. In the simplest system, each voter has one vote and the single candidate who receives the most votes, irrespective of the percentage of these votes among the total number of votes cast, is declared the single winner.
In this work, we use the protocol that we introduced in our previous work [3] , which combines features from both STV and cumulative voting. Specifically, this protocol takes advantage of the features of cumulative voting to express the preferences using points, and at the same time allow for multiple rounds to avoid wastage by allowing the transfer of points in a similar way to the transfer of votes in STV. In addition to the voting procedure, we also introduced and evaluated a number of reasonable voting strategies that can be used by the student agents in the system. However, different from our previous work, where courses were independent, we consider settings with combinatorial student preferences.
Combinatorial preferences have been mostly studied within the context of combinatorial auctions, although there are a couple of papers that consider such preferences in a voting setting. Specifically, combinatorial voting, has been studied by researched in [5, 6] . In these works, agents are assumed to vote for given bundles of candidates. Since enumerating all possible combinations of candidates is typically infeasible, the main problem is then which of these bundles should be selected by the system and voted on by the agents. Our paper takes a different approach and uses an a multi-round voting protocol, where in each round the candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated. Furthermore, it uses an agent-based approach where agents can update their votes in each round to reflect the remaining candidates.
In terms of representing preferences, a number of languages have been introduced in both combinatorial voting and auctions. Some of these languages are tailored to represent cardinal preferences while others represent ordinal preferences. With regard to the nature of the language itself, some of the languages are graphical (such as CP-net or GAI-net) and some others are based on propositional logic such as bidding languages for combinatorial auctions [7] . Expressing preferences that allows agents to specify preferences concisely and clearly include the OR-language and XOR-language from the combinatorial auctions field [8] . In the OR-language, the valuation of a bundle is taken to be the maximal value that can be obtained when computing the sum over disjoint bids for subsets of the bundle while in the XOR-language one bundle at most can be counted and the valuation of a bundle is simply the highest value offered for any of its subsets [9] . Conitzer [10] shows an example to illustrate the mechanism behind these languages. For OR-language, assume the bid as following ( In this paper we use the same principle as the languages discussed above, but to limit the number of combinations only consider interdependencies between two courses. In particular, we model two types of relationships: complementary (AND) and substitute (OR). We describe that in more details in Section 3.2.
Agent Technology for e-Learning
In e-learning, multiagent systems appear to be a promising approach to deal with the challenges in educational environments. They can provide new patterns of learning and applications, such as personal assistants, user guides and alternative help systems, which are helpful for both students and teachers in their computer-aided learning-teaching process [11] . Using multiagent systems to design educational systems could lead to more versatile, faster and lower cost systems [12] . A number of researchers have applied agent technology to e-learning. De Meo et al. [13] proposed the X-Learn system which is a XML based multiagent system for adaptive e-learning based on user preferences and requirements. However, they focus on the adaptation and how to exploit XML technology facilities for handling and exchanging information related to e-learning activities. Shi et al. [14] designed an integrated multiagent systems for computer science education that focuses on two introductory courses where the learning process is student-centered, self-paced and highly interactive. They use Java RMI, JavaSpace and JATLite to create a web-based system; in this case they use personal agents to manage student's data and their interactions with course material.
Although these papers apply agents in e-learning, none of these papers apply any fundamental agent theories, such as mechanism design or social choice theory, to guide their design choices. In contrast, our approach is to apply voting mechanisms to an elearning scenario where the candidates represent all the courses available, and where students can vote in any way he or she prefers. Thus our work explores, for the first time, voting procedures in an e-learning setting for combinatorial preferences.
The Multiagent System
This section describes the architecture of our system including the voting procedure (Section 3.1), how we model the complex student preferences (Section 3.2), and three different voting strategies (Section 3.3). Figure 1 shows the entities and objects that form the system. Our system consists of two types of agents: the university agent (UA) and student agents (SAs). At first, the SA is provided by the student with the initial settings including student's preferences and also an appropriate voting strategy (in our experiments we automatically generate these according to the parameters of the experiment). Then the SAs and the UA use a voting procedure to interact with each other and determine which courses to run. To this end, The UA manages the votes cast by students for each course and at the end of each voting round decides whether this course will be cancelled. After the whole process is finished it also provides the SAs with a final list of running courses.
The Architecture
We use the same protocol as in our previous work, and briefly summarize the protocol below. For a full description see [3] . The protocol proceeds in several rounds as follows:
1. Each SA initially receives an equal and fixed number of points, from the UA that they can use to cast their votes.
2. In each round, each SA can allocate some or all of their available points to the available courses (they do not have to allocate all their points, but cannot allocate more than they have). 4. The UA cancels the course with the lowest cumulative points.
5. The UA refunds the points for the cancelled course.
6. The UA informs all the SAs about the cancelled course, and the current cumulative points allocated to the remaining courses.
7. Now the protocol proceeds to the next round and SAs can vote again using their remaining points (this includes the refunded points as well as any points which were not allocated in the previous rounds), and the process is repeated until the desired number of courses is remaining.
For example, if there are 40 courses available in total, but the university only has sufficient resources (e.g. staff and lecture rooms) to run 30 courses, then the voting will proceed for 10 rounds. At the end of each of these rounds, the course with the least number of cumulative points is cancelled.
Student Preferences
The student preferences are modeled using a utility function. In our previous work, a student's preferences for certain combinations of courses were simply the sum of the preferences for each individual course. The latter was as a number between 0 and 10, where 0 means that the student has no interest in the course and 10 means maximum interest. In this paper we build on this by adding a relationships between courses.
Specifically, in our model the utility of a course may depend of which other courses are running. To reflect this we modeled two types of relationship: complementary (AND) and substitute (OR). Two courses A and B are complementary when the student is only interested in choosing course A if course B is running, and vice versa. Conversely, courses A and B are substitutes if a student is interested in course A or course B, but not both. We assume that each student has a (possible) different set of rules, where each represents either an AND or an OR relationship between a pair of courses.
Given this, the utility function of a student is modeled as follows. Let ‫ܥ‬ = ‫ܥ{‬ ଵ , ‫ܥ‬ ଶ , … , ‫ܥ‬ } denote the set of courses, and ‫ݒ‬ ሬሬሬ⃗ = ൛‫ݒ‬ ଵ , ‫ݒ‬ ଶ, , … . , ‫ݒ‬ ൟ denote the individual utilities (in case there are no rules) for these courses, where m is the total number of available courses to choose from. Furthermore, let ܴ ைோ denote the set of OR rules, which specifies a set of pairs of courses ‫ܥ(‬ , ‫ܥ‬ ), and similarly ܴ ே denotes the set of AND rules. To avoid conflicts, we assume that each course is only part of one rule. Therefore, the same course cannot appear both in an OR rule and an AND rule. Then, the utility for a set of running courses, is calculated as follows. For any running course ‫ܥ‬ that does appear in a rule, the utility is simply the sum of the individual utilities ‫ݒ‬ of those c. For any pair of courses ൫‫ܥ‬ , ‫ܥ‬ ൯ ∈ ܴ ைோ , if both courses are running, the utility for the pair is max ‫ݒ(‬ , ‫ݒ‬ ). If only one of them is running, then the utility is equal to the individual utility for that course. For any pair of courses ൫‫ܥ‬ , ‫ܥ‬ ൯ ∈ ܴ ே , if both courses are running, the utility for the pair is ‫ݒ‬ + ‫ݒ‬ . Otherwise, the utility is zero. The total utility is then the sum of the individual courses without rules, and the pairs with rules. Using this utility, we then calculate the student satisfaction by taking the utility as a percentage of the utility the student would achieve when all the courses would be running.
To clarify, consider the example in figure 1 . Here, there are 6 courses, and 2 student agents. The preferences of SA 1 are as follows: ‫ݒ‬ ሬሬሬ⃗ = {7,3,4,2,1,8} and the rule are:‫ܥ‬ ଵ OR ‫ܥ‬ ସ , ‫ܥ‬ ଷ OR ‫ܥ‬ ହ , ‫ܥ‬ ଶ AND ‫ܥ‬ . The preferences of a SA 2 are: ‫ݒ‬ ሬሬሬ⃗ = {3,8,7,3,5,1} the rule are as follows: ‫ܥ‬ ଵ AND ‫ܥ‬ ହ . Let's consider SA 1 first. The total utility if all courses are running is calculated as follows. The relationship between ‫ܥ‬ ଵ and ‫ܥ‬ ସ is OR, so we take the higher value which is ‫ݒ‬ ଵ = 7. The relationship between ‫ܥ‬ ଷ and ‫ܥ‬ ହ is also OR so we will take the higher one which is ‫ݒ‬ ଷ = 4. Finally, and ‫ݒ‬ has an AND relationship with ‫ݒ‬ ଶ so we will take the sum of them 4+ 8= 12. The total utility is therefore 7+4+12=23. Now, the university decides to cancel ‫ܥ‬ ଵ . In this case, the actual utility will be 1+4+12=17. The student satisfaction is then given by 17/23*100% ≈ 74%. With regards to SA 2, the total utility if all courses are running is calculated as follows. Where is only a relationship between ‫ܥ‬ ଵ and ‫ܥ‬ ହ which is OR, so we take the sum of them 3+5 = 8. And the we will calculate the rest of preferences as normal summation bases 8+7+3+1 = 19. The total utility is therefore 8+19 =27. As mentioned before the university decides to cancel ‫ܥ‬ ଵ . In this case, the actual utility will be 8+7+3+1 = 19. ‫ܥ‬ ହ is eliminated as it has AND relationship with ‫ܥ‬ ଵ . The student satisfaction for this student is then given by 19/24*100% ≈ 70%.
Strategies
We now present strategies that an agent could use to vote in our system using these complex preferences. In [3] we tested three different strategies with simple preferences (no rules) in order to test the effect of different proportions of students using the different strategies. In the current paper we kept the same strategies (in order to compare to the previous results) but adjusted the more advanced strategies to take the complex preferences into account.
A strategy determines the agent's plan of action to achieve a particular goal. It specifies the way in which an agent behaves in a given environment [4] . In our scenario, the strategy uses the preferences of the student and the information received by the UA about the voting process to determine the number of points the courses is allocated in each voting round. In this paper, to explore what would happen to students that choose different strategies, we compare three different strategies for the SAs. These strategies are: proportional, equal share and intelligent.
Proportional: The proportional strategy is an example of a simple but sensible strategy that provides a good benchmark that can be used to compare the performance of other more sophisticated strategies. This strategy is simple as it does not consider the information received by the UA about the current number of points allocated to the courses. The main idea behind a proportional strategy is that in each round of voting, the SA will take the rules between courses into account when distributing the points and distribute them proportionally to the student's preferences for each course.
The strategy takes the rules into account in the following way in case of complementary preferences (AND rules) between courses. Suppose a canceled course has an AND relationship with other course (e.g. ‫ܥ‬ ଵ AND ‫ܥ‬ ଶ , and ‫ܥ‬ ଵ is cancelled), then the SA will exclude the dependent course ‫ܥ(‬ ଶ ) from the points distribution process and try to benefit from these point by spending them elsewhere. The strategy does not take into account any OR relationships, since it cannot know which course will eventually be running.
Given this, the number of points allocated to course j (after applying the rules) is calculated as follows. Let RP denote the total number of points remaining and IP denotes the number of initial points (in the first round IP=RP), m is the total number of available courses available, and the vector ‫ݒ‬ ሬሬሬ⃗ = ൛‫ݒ‬ ଵ , ‫ݒ‬ ଶ, , … . , ‫ݒ‬ ൟ denotes the student preferences. Then, the total number of points to be allocated to course j, ܾ is:
‫ݒ‬
Equal share: The equal share strategy is included as an example of a very simple but ineffective strategy, and provides a good lower bound on the performance of the system. An equal share strategy is based on the principle that the SA gives all courses an equal number of votes, regardless of the student's preference. The following formula was used to calculate voting points each course:
The intelligent strategy is considered an advanced measurer of what can be achieved. It is a more sophisticated strategy that takes into account both the AND and OR rules, and learns from one round to the next as the voting procedure progresses. Its effectiveness can be gauged by comparing it to the proportional strategy and the lower bound given by the equal share strategy. The main idea behind this strategy is that, in each round, the agent tries to predict the probability that a course will be cancelled based on the number of points currently allocated to each course from previous rounds by the agents in the system (this information is provided to all the SAs by the UA at the end of each round). The intelligent strategy here differs from what we have done in previous experiments in that it will consider the rules between courses when calculating the probability. Thus, for each pair of courses the probability will be calculated differently for OR relationship and AND relationship.
When allocating points, unlike the strategies described above, this strategy does not spend all the points in the first round, in order to take advantage of the information that is received in subsequent rounds. Otherwise, it would have no more points to use in these rounds (unless a course for which votes were cast is cancelled, in which case the points are returned). In our experiments we found that allocating half of the points in each round (including any points refunded from cancelled courses) performed well. In the last voting round, it allocates all remaining points. Furthermore, in first round, because the strategy does not have any information about courses, it distribute half of the points using the proportional strategy as explained above. We now explain how the strategy chooses to allocate its points in subsequent.
The strategy consists of three parts. First, it tries to estimate the probabilities of course being cancelled. Then, given these probabilities, it tries to estimate the expected utility (we use utility here instead of satisfaction since there is no need to normalize) for a given distribution of points. Finally, it uses a search algorithm to find the point distribution which maximizes expected satisfaction. In what follows, we discuss these components in turn.
The probability of a course being cancelled is estimated using a softmax function, which is commonly used in discrete choice theory to make decisions in the case of incomplete information [15] Specifically, the probability that a course i is going to be cancelled in the future is given by:
Where cp is the cumulative number of points which have so far been allocated to course ‫ܥ‬ (including points from other agents), and ܾ ݅ is the number of points that the SA is planning to allocate to course ‫ܥ‬ in the current voting round, and ܾ ሬ⃗ is the vector of points to be allocated. Furthermore, ߚ is a constant which enables a range of different strategies. For example, if ߚ = 0, then each course is equally likely to be cancelled, irrespective of the cumulative number of points currently allocated. At the other extreme, as ߚ → ∞, the course with the lowest total number of points will be cancelled with probability 1, and all other courses will be cancelled with probability 0. All other cases fall somewhere in between. In our experiments we tune the parameter ߚ such that it performs well in practice.
We now show how we can use this probability to calculate the expected utility, EU, of an SA, given the vector of points, ܾ ሬ⃗ , and taking into account both AND and OR relationship. This works as follows. Suppose we have an AND relationship between ‫ܥ‬ ଵ and ‫ܥ‬ ଶ . In order to calculate the expected utility, we need to know the probability that both of these courses will run, i.e.,
By assuming independence of the probabilities for different courses, we can do this by simply taking the product. Now, in the case of the OR relationship between ‫ܥ‬ ଵ and ‫ܥ‬ ଶ , we need to consider also the possibility that only one of them will run, and the other is canceled. This gives the following expected utility for individual or pairs of courses, depending on the rules between courses: The total expected utility is then the sum of the expected utility for all courses without rules, and the expected utility of all course pairs with rules.
Note that the expected utility depends on ܾ ሬሬ⃗ , i.e. the number of points it is going to allocate to each course in the next round. The next step is then to find the allocation that maximises this expected utility. We estimate this using a search algorithm based on random sampling, which proceeds as follows:
We randomly generate an allocation vector ܾ ሬ⃗ subject to the constraint that the total number of points is equal to the maximum number of points that we would like to spend in the current round. The student agent calculates the expected utility as above. If the current solution has a higher expected satisfaction than any previous solution, then keep the solution. Otherwise, it discards it. This process is repeated for 1000 times and the solution with the highest expected utility is kept.
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the voting procedure and explore the impact of the three strategies described above on the overall student satisfaction when students' preferences become sophisticated by including AND and OR rules. To assess the quality of a strategy, we use two measures. First, we measure the average student satisfaction. Furthermore, we can compare the performance of different strategies by looking at the average satisfaction of the sub-group that uses that strategy. In this way we can see if the voting approach might advantage those students who use more intelligent agents.
We tried to keep the main factors influencing the behavior of the agents used in previous experiments the same to make the comparisons clear. So in order to evaluate the strategies, we identify the variables and present a number of meaningful scenarios. The following variables were identified in the simulations:
Number of courses (m): This is the total number of courses that the university provides and in which the student can vote for.
Number of running courses (r): This is the remaining total number of courses after the ones with the lowest student interest have been cancelled.
Number of students (n): This is the total number of students in the system. We vary the above values for different scenarios, which are explained in detail in Section 4.1. In addition to the above variables, we also have a number of constants:
Initial points (IP): This is the number of points that each student initially receives. Without loss of generality, we set this value to 100 in the experiments.
ߚ: This is used when calculating the probability of a course being cancelled for the intelligent strategy (see Section 3.3) . Throughout this experiment, we set this value to 100 since it was shown in initial tests to perform well.
Finally, we perform each experiment 30 times with different randomly generated student preferences, to obtain statistically significant results. We next explain how these preferences are generated.
Student Agent Preferences
For each student and each course we start by randomly generating preferences from a uniform distribution between 0 and 10. And then for every time we run the simulation we generate the AND and OR relationships. This is done as follows. First, we generate all possible AND and OR relationships. Then, we select a subset of these rules from which the students can select. We do this to increase the likelihood that groups of students have similar relationships between courses. This is true in practice, since often students have the same relationships between courses, even if they value the individual courses differently. Now, we can vary the degree of similarity by a parameter which sets the size of the subset as a percentage of the total number of possible rules. Figure 2 show an example of this generation, for m=6 course available in total. In this case, the number of relationships can be generated here is n*(n-1) = 6*5 = 30 relationships. According to the percentage given for this experiment (50%), we have 15 rules left.
We then apply a number of simple constrains to the generation of the student preferences: no more than one relationship involving any given each course to avoid cycles, and only one type of relationship (OR or AND) between the same courses to avoid conflicts. In this case end up with three rules after applying the constraints; ‫ܥ(‬ ଵ OR ‫ܥ‬ ସ ), ‫ܥ(‬ ଷ AND ‫ܥ‬ ହ ), ‫ܥ(‬ ଶ OR ‫ܥ‬ ).
University Scenarios
In this section we present the multiagent system used to simulate a course selection scenario system. We consider the same three different cases that have been used in previous work to we compare the result from this experiment with what we have got from the previous one. These cases differ in terms of the number of students, the number of total modules, and the number of running modules. Table 1 shows the settings for these cases. These cases have been chosen to reflect the kind of courses typical in UK University departments. The column # courses (m) shows how many courses there are for each case. We consider a large (undergraduate), medium (smaller undergraduate) and small (postgraduate) module. The column #running courses (r) shows the number of courses that will eventually run. The column #students (n) shows the number of students in the experiments. 
Analysis
We compare the case where a proportion of the students use one strategy, and the remainder of the students uses another strategy. In the results that follow, the y-axis shows the student satisfaction for each group of agents using a particular strategy, as well as the overall average satisfaction. Furthermore, on the x-axis we vary the proportion of students using a particular strategy for different percentage of applied rules. For example, in figure 3 and 4, 10-90 means that 10 students use the proportional strategy, and 90 students use the equal share strategy and it repeat for three different setting: NO rules, 50% rules and 100% rules. The errorbars show the 95% confidence intervals.
The results in figures 3 and 4 show that the intelligent and proportional strategies are both clearly better than the equal share. Specifically, it can be seen that, as the number of rules increases, the better the intelligent and proportional strategies perform. On average, the improvement is around 4%, 6%, 9%, for NO rules, 50% and 100% rules respectively. Furthermore, the average satisfaction of all students also increases, which means that the allocation is more efficient when students use a more intelligent voting approach. The results for other scenarios are very similar and not shown to avoid repetition. Figures 5 shows that, at first glance, the performance of intelligent strategy increases, comparing to proportional strategy, as the students apply more rules. However, in most cases this result is not statistically significant. The reasons why the results between the two strategies is similar are as follows. First, the number of courses that the students vote over is large. This means that the range of student choice in which student choose course is wide, and students have a wide range of preferences. Second, the number of students voting is also large. This means that each individual student has very little voting power. To analyze this, we now consider a setting where the number of students and courses are small. Figures 6 and 7 show that, with relatively few courses and students, there are clear differences in the performance of the intelligent and proportional strategies. The intelligent strategy significantly outperforms proportional strategy when student apply rules and this superiority is increased as more rules are applied. The hypothesis that the intelligent strategy improvement is greater than the improvement of proportional strategy is true in almost all cases where rules were applied, according to a t-test with 95%. This No rules 50% rules 100% rules 100% rules 50% rules No rules suggests that, when students have fewer choices and therefore there is less differentiation between the students, and when the number of students is not too large, the intelligent strategy perform better than proportional. Note also that, as the proportion of students using the intelligent strategy increases, the student satisfaction of all students either stays the same, or increases. Therefore, using a more intelligent approach does not harm the system as a whole. 
Conclusion
We presented a multiagent system based on voting theory that shows the potential of autonomous software agent that votes on a student's behalf according to kind of complementary and substitutable preferences between courses. We also developed a number of different voting strategies that student agents could use to arrives the chosen courses and examine the resulting student satisfaction. We found that, when students have complex preferences and the number of students is not too large such that each individual student can affect the voting outcome, the intelligent strategy performs significantly better than proportional.
Our future work consists of two parts. First of all, we intend to apply fairness principals to the voting outcome. Whereas we considered average student satisfaction, it is not clear if certain individual students are disadvantaged. Furthermore, we intend to consider other intelligent voting strategies and alternative voting procedures, and explore constraints such as limitations on the number of courses that a student can take, and having pre-requisite courses.
